Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness

Epistemological and ontological conceptions of information are contrasted. The former are based on acts of decoding of extrinsic input that result in the decoder becoming informed. The latter are based on intrinsic states or state changes of the system independent of any external factors such as inputs to the system. I argue here that ontological conceptions of information, such as those that underlie integrated information theory or any theory that allies itself with panpsychism, are not able to account for consciousness. In the only physical systems that are known to be conscious, namely, animal brains, acts of decoding extrinsic inputs are central to creating consciousness and its contents. Moreover, only a very specific subset of decodings should realize consciousness, because consciousness in animals evolved to create an evaluative world model of what is intrinsically true about the world and the body, which is then used in a perception-action cycle that affords choices among options for behaving in the world in order to accomplish goals.