Gr\"obner Basis Cryptanalysis of Ciminion and Hydra

Ciminion and Hydra are two recently introduced symmetric key Pseudo-Random Functions for Multi-Party Computation applications. For efficiency both primitives utilize quadratic permutations at round level. Therefore, polynomial system solving-based attacks pose a serious threat to these primitives. For Ciminion we construct a quadratic degree reverse lexicographic (DRL) Gr\"obner basis for the iterated polynomial model via affine transformations. For Hydra we provide a computer-aided proof in SageMath that a quadratic DRL Gr\"obner basis is already contained within the iterated polynomial system for the Hydra heads after affine transformations and a linear change of coordinates. Our Ciminion DRL Gr\"obner basis simplifies cryptanalysis, since one does not need to impose genericity assumptions, like being regular or semi-regular, anymore to derive complexity estimates on key recovery attacks. In the Hydra proposal it was claimed that rH = 31 rounds for the heads are sufficient to achieve $128$ bits of security against Gr\"obner basis attacks for key recovery. However, for rH = 31 standard term order conversion to a lexicographic (LEX) Gr\"obner basis for our Hydra DRL Gr\"obner basis requires just $126$ bits. Moreover, via the Eigenvalue Method up to rH = 33 rounds can be attacked below $128$ bits.