Lottocracy and class‐specific political institutions: A plebeian constitutionalist defense

Skepticism about the democratic nature of elections-based institutional systems is a growing sentiment among political theorists. There are many reasons explaining such skepticism, but one prominent concern is that these systems make representatives susceptible to capture by economic elites, in other words, oligarchic capture. Champions of electoral democracy commonly claim that oligarchic capture can be fought through legally-based, formal mechanisms of regulation, such as campaign finance and anti-money-in-politics legislation. But others think that elections, as such, are an important factor contributing to this problem. Authors have thus claimed that we should either fully replace (e.g., Guerrero, 2014; Van Reybrouck, 2016) or complement (e.g., Abizadeh, 2020; Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Gastil & Wright, 2019; Landemore, 2020; McCormick, 2011) election-based political systems with empowered "lottocratic" political institutions (henceforth LPIs), wherein representatives are selected randomly from a relevant demographic and then frequently rotated.i This, some argue, would help solving the oligarchical tendencies of electoral democracy and better realize its normative aspirations. This article has two distinct aims: First, to suggest that we should reconsider our optimism regarding the anti-oligarchic strength of LPIs. Second, to show how we can amend the design of LPIs to resist oligarchic capture, particularly by making them class-specific so that they are more explicitly oriented to the satisfaction of the interests of nonwealthy citizens. The reason for my moderate pessimism is that LPIs might suffer from similar oligarchic ills as those plaguing electoral systems. Under nonideal conditions, where there is significant wealth inequality and a power imbalance between, on the one hand, influential organized elites and, on the other, widely economically self-interested and politically unorganized citizens, many representatives in LPIs would still have strong incentives to neglect the pursuit of responsive and democratic outcomes—despite the presence of legal mechanisms of regulation. Call this the problem of incentives-based capture (henceforth PIC). Thus, my argument is that we must think beyond formal, legally based measures of regulation, and focus on informal mechanisms, particularly on how the prevalence of class-based solidarity among lottocratic representatives could counteract PIC. Drawing on recent "plebeian" approaches in democratic constitutional theory, I shall defend the claim that introducing class-specific criteria in institutional design can help to buttress a reluctance among representatives to follow wealth-generated incentives. Plebeian constitutionalists usually argue that selecting members only with that class-specific profile makes it more likely for them to develop bonds of solidarity. However, the role of class solidarity and the prioritization of plebeian interests in making a compelling case for anti-oligarchic LPIs has not been adequately explored in the current literature. Additionally, the normative implications of this perspective have not been sufficiently addressed. I expand on these points by discussing, on the one hand, the conceptual characteristics of class specificity and solidarity and how the former would reasonably maximize the latter. On the other hand, I argue that such an explanation entails a partisan vision of LPIs, in contrast to the centrality of impartial deliberation typically championed by lottocrats. The result is a stronger case for the anti-oligarchic potential and democratic justification of LPIs. This article is structured as follows: Section 1 situates the argument in the context of the oligarchic tendencies of electoral-representative government, explaining the main benefits of sortition, and why LPIs may still be vulnerable to PIC. Section 2 defends and expands on plebeian constitutionalist approaches, emphasizing the significance of class-specificity in constructing anti-oligarchic LPIs. I then address the normative conflict between their explicitly partisan nature and the democratic value of impartial deliberation. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the argument and discussing several important limitations and challenges. The growing literature criticizing electoral-representative government is motivated by a shared diagnosis of the strong tendencies of such systems to degenerate into plutocratic oligarchies, that is, political systems whose decision-making outcomes mirror the interests of economically advantaged groups while neglecting those of the rest of the polity.ii Authors largely conceptualize this issue in terms of a "… rising wealth concentration and discretionary forms of elite influence that allow super-rich actors to elude popular scrutiny while pursuing their own political objectives" (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 10), and so in an instrumental manner related to the concerted political agency of the wealthy. But here I will also take it to be a structural issue, related to how political decision-making usually drifts toward their interests without them having to act (Leipold et al., 2020, p. 12). This is partly because liberal democracies under capitalist conditions have an institutional interest in "…promoting those conditions most conducive to accumulation" (Offe & Ronge, 1982, p. 250). Furthermore, economic elites can stop policies to the benefit of the public if they believe their interests are being negatively impacted. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that these elites can also exert influence over the democratic process simply by the positions that they hold within the class structure (e.g., Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1986). Accordingly, I define that oligarchic capture obtains whenever the interests of economic elites are overly represented and/or dominate the procedures and outcomes of political institutions. Many authors have recently claimed that this issue is partly generated and/or sustained because liberal democracies rely too heavily on electoral forms of representation. But why? Arguments against systems based on popular elections of representatives are numerous.iii However, egalitarian democrats concerned with the problem of oligarchic capture often emphasize its excessively elitist characteristics. For one, elections often result in a small portion of the citizenry, typically wealthy, holding office (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 7; Guerrero, 2014; Manin, 1997; McCormick, 2011, p. 92). These individuals are more likely to prioritize the interests of the wealthy, which often happen to be themselves. Further, the combination of the ex-ante identifiability of elected representatives, their independence during interim elections, their significant political power, as well as their expected re-election aspirations, create great incentives and opportunities for the wealthy to exert influence over them at a fairly low cost—for example, through campaign finance, lobbying, or bribery. This elitism plausibly intensifies structural forms of oligarchization, as compliance with market imperatives is also expected to align with the interests of wealthy incumbents or their funders. Elected representatives thus seem to be "… little more than agents of the powerful" (Guerrero, 2014, p. 143). This picture is, on one level, too simplistic. Champions of electoral democracy argue that the challenges posed by oligarchy are not solely a result of elections and can be mitigated through various interventions, particularly through the implementation of formal, legally-based mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation (such as legislation to protect representatives from the influence of the wealthy). Elections are also reasonably valuable on democratic grounds. They serve an important practice through which citizens can exercise their partisan political agency, hold representatives accountable, and even punish them if necessary. However, in light of the actual failure of these formal regulations to be successful, there are compelling reasons to believe that "…[n]either electoral sanctions nor criminal prosecutions are fully effective against legal forms of sheltering [and oligarchization]" (Arlen, 2022, p. 9), and that something else is necessary to effectively achieve democratic orders that can avoid oligarchic capture (Akbar, 2020; Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). As I have already indicated, one option is to complement our political systems with authoritative institutions based on a different form of appointing democratic representatives: sortition.iv But why would this be considered remedial, and what are the main democratic values embodied by LPIs? Specific designs for LPIs are various, but their general appeal is well-captured in what Landa and Pevnick (2020) call the "standard case"—that is, the idea that sortition better satisfies a substantively democratic understanding of political equality and that it likely leads to less oligarchic outcomes than elections. A good way to understand the common view held by lottocrats is thus to describe this standard case more extensively. After doing so we will be in a better position to assess whether the democratic promises of LPIs are plausible. The first, political equality-based part of the standard case states that, because sortition gives all candidates an "… equal prospect of being selected to office, it treats all candidates as equals" (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 2; see also Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 9). Put differently, in contrast to the elitist biases of electoral systems, lottocrats argue that sortition "…better reflects egalitarian ideals, since anyone might wield political power, and everyone has an equal chance of doing so" (Guerrero, 2014, pp. 168–169). This reason is closely linked to the fact that sortition-based mechanisms promise to fulfill a form of descriptive representation, whereby "…representative bodies […] come very close to mirroring the broader society" (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 3). This, authors argue, would also help to realize the value of impartial deliberation among representatives—which would henceforth bring about outcomes more responsive to the general interests of the polity (Abizadeh, 2020; Bagg & Schulson, 2019; Gastil & Wright, 2019).v One reason explaining this is that randomly selected representatives would likely be ordinary citizens. These citizens not only have first-hand knowledge about popular grievances, but also have much more diverse profiles compared to elite representatives. Furthermore, descriptive representation involves including voices in democratic deliberation that were previously excluded and increasing internal diversity, which can provide valuable input for the quality of political outcomes and help avoid oligarchic bias (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 79; Pek, 2021, p. 199). The second part of the standard case consists of the claim that LPIs possess several anti-oligarchic benefits when compared to elections. Simply put, the reason is that sortition eliminates several avenues for capture that elections are susceptible to. Given that ex-ante identifiability is ruled out, the problem of campaign funding is also canceled. This means that lottocratic representatives would not be indebted to wealthy supporters to hold office (Guerrero, 2014, p. 164; Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 9). Also, since there is no need to raise funds for re-election (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 79; Manin, 1997), representatives would have significantly reduced incentives to engage with wealthy lobbyists or make decisions aimed at pleasing them. Moreover, because members rotate regularly, buying off particular representatives would become costly and less durable (Guerrero, 2014, p. 164). Accordingly, intending to materialize both aspects of the standard case, authors like Gastil and Wright (2019) have proposed to constitutionalize, alongside a parliament, a sortitioned Second Chamber, and Abizadeh (2020) has built on this model to more concretely imagine a sortitioned Senate in the context of contemporary Canada. Similarly, outside the context and language of bicameralism, Hélène Landemore defends the democratic credentials of what she calls the "open mini-public", namely, "… a large, all-purpose, randomly selected assembly of between 150 and a thousand people or so, gathered for an extended period of time (from at least a few days to a few years) for the purpose of agenda-setting and law-making of some kind, and connected via crowdsourcing platforms and deliberative forums (including other mini-publics) to the larger population" (Landemore, 2020, p. 13). These are just a few examples of a lottocratic imaginary that seeks to enable ordinary citizens to hold the reigns of political power, achieve more responsive outcomes, and combat the oligarchization of representative government. While the picture presented by the standard case may seem naively optimistic about the potential of LPIs, their champions do tend to recognize that these are not the panacea for fighting oligarchic power. This is not only because of the obvious importance of other actors and institutions in pursuing that end but also because LPIs themselves could be susceptible to capture. Along these lines, authors usually propose to complement these institutions with legal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation, such as "…laws regulating the role of money in politics" (Landemore, 2020, 196) or 'firewalls' protecting members "…from lobbyists [whereby] contact would be legally restricted to official and publicly transparent channels" (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 12). Hence, while authors do not imagine LPIs to possess inherent resistance against oligarchization, I take it they are optimistic that such measures would significantly reduce the likelihood of infection. Otherwise, the allure of the standard case would be severely diminished, and it would lose its comparative attractiveness relative to nonlottocratic institutions of representation. I find this optimism insufficiently justified. I object that the lottocratic critique of elections does not sufficiently grapple with the implications of constitutionalizing LPIs under imperfect current conditions, in which citizens remain responsive to incentives generated by great socioeconomic inequalities. Under such conditions, it is reasonable to believe that wealthy groups will still be able and willing to exercise a great degree of influence over lottocratic representatives, just as they do over elected ones (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 6). For example, the wealthy could engage in forms of instrumental capture (such as bribery) even though, as already discussed, there are good reasons to hold that LPIs are significantly less vulnerable to them than electoral institutions (Umbers, 2018, pp. 16–17; Shapiro, 2016, pp. 258–259, no. 11). But optimistic proponents of LPIs also seem to ignore or downplay, in a more problematic way, the entrenched problem that the wealthy can create and/or rely on incentive structures that nudge representatives towards satisfying their interests—what I have already called the problem of incentives-based capture (PIC). On the one hand, PIC can be generated by the capacity of wealthy actors to actively mobilize their resources to directly incentivize representatives, for example by making it known that those who defend their interests while in office will be duly rewarded (e.g., through future, well-paid jobs; Landa & Pevnick, 2020, pp. 8–13). On the other hand, the wealthy can exercise indirect influence by sustaining a social environment that fosters capitalist and/or pro-market ideology. They can do this by affecting representatives' assessment of the economy through several mechanisms, such as manipulating the informational context available to them to conduct such assessments. For example, owning media outlets (e.g., newspapers, TV stations, or digital companies; Aytac, 2022)vi or investing in advertisement (Wojdynski & Evans, 2020) allows them to promote narratives suggesting that political decisions going against their interests would inevitably result in steep costs that individuals cannot afford to bear—and which representatives would, therefore, tend to avoid taking. This phenomenon is likely to be more impactful to political decisions in contexts like neoliberal societies (which are those most vulnerable to oligarchization), where citizens are widely disorganized, politically disinformed, self-interested, and vulnerable to manipulation (Grossman et al., 2022; Morgan & Pulignano, 2020).vii Thus, the wealthy could continue to impress the powerful idea that retaining a climate of "business confidence" (Block, 1977, p. 15)—and avoiding capital's flight by fulfilling its wishes—is imperative for sustaining a healthy political community. Put differently, insofar as representatives can be expected to yield to such structural incentives, they will have a "…strong personal interest in catering to the needs of wealthy and powerful groups" (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 9; see also Roberts, 2022, p. 49—my emphasis). This means that the anti-oligarchic force of LPIs is severely weakened and that the appeal of the standard case is also diminished.viii Is there an alternative way to vindicate it?ix My view is that we must reply to the aforementioned question in the affirmative, and that it is worthy to explore how. Essentially, I believe that not only it is the case that the anti-oligarchic benefits of LPIs are significant (e.g., in eliminating many relevant sources of instrumental capture) but, importantly also that formal mechanisms of regulation are not the only means to counteract or reduce the influence of pro-wealth incentives. This section explores one such alternative, namely, the implementation of informal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation within LPIs. Such mechanisms do not rely on legally enforceable measures, but rather on how representatives' behavior may be "internally" regulated, such as by adherence to organically developed anti-oligarchic norms or ethical codes. Expanding on "plebeian constitutionalist" contributions (e.g., Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Hamilton, 2014; McCormick, 2011; Mulvad & Stahl, 2019), I argue more concretely that modeling LPIs along class-specific criteria can help create and strengthen such mechanisms, particularly through fostering forms of class solidarity among representatives. Let me start by briefly explaining the plebeian constitutionalist rationale for class-specific LPIs. Plebeian conceptions of constitutional democracy are typically defined by the belief that a proper understanding of our social landscape must acknowledge the significant impact of wealth disparities on the political sphere. They also put the problem of the great influence of economic elites over policymaking at the centre of their analysis and propose that addressing this issue requires the establishment of class-specific political institutions. Put differently, plebeian constitutionalists seek to make "… democratic theory class-conscious again" (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 593) and provide "… ordinary citizens [with] formal spaces for enacting their class-based disadvantage" (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 14) via the creation of class-specific political institutions. As expected, this reasoning affects their theorization of LPIs. For example, McCormick (2011) has proposed to constitutionalize the "People's Tribunate" in the US: a LPI excluding the wealthiest 10% of the population from eligibility, wherein members would rotate every year, and which would hold strong constitutional powers such as vetoing law and the ability to call referenda. Arlen and Rossi (2020) have recently expanded McCormick's model to what they call a "Tribunate System", that is, a set of multiple and interconnected class-specific LPIs, wherein members would rotate every 2 years, each focused on overseeing a particular policy area perceived to be especially vulnerable to oligarchic capture—such as elected representatives' performance, cases of direct and indirect lobbying, the media's influence in politics, and the doings of elite philanthropists.x All in all, the main idea is that introducing class-specificity to LPIs would enhance their ability to counteract oligarchy. While this story may have initial plausibility, we need to explain why class-specificity reduces the power of PIC and how it would contribute to a more effective fulfillment of the standard case. In this context, it is of fundamental importance to note that, for these authors, such is the case because this institutional feature would foster class solidarity among representatives and the popular masses (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 589). Thus, the idea is that emphasizing the existence of class divisions could catalyze and amplify the socioeconomic identity of randomly selected members, which would henceforth strengthen their solidaristic bonds and create effective informal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 18; Klein, 2022, p. 10).xi Representatives would then be less likely to accept perverse wealth-generated incentives, and thus more likely to generate responsive and positive outcomes. Put differently, the hypothesis is that class specificity maximizes class solidarity, and that, by doing so, helps to counteract PIC. Although one might find this story appealing, plebeian constitutionalists' specifications of the meaning of class solidarity, the reasons why it could be produced by class-specificity, and how it would reduce PIC, are rather scattered and unsystematic. A compelling explanation of the advantages of class-specificity in the context of effectively implementing anti-oligarchic LPIs must be more thorough. That is what this section aims to deliver. By elaborating on the conceptual content of the theory of class solidarity in action, I will also provide some empirical reasons that suggest how class-specificity would plausibly enhance it. Let me begin by exploring the fundamental characteristics of the concept of solidarity, in a broad sense. While its meaning and practical possibilities are contested in contemporary literature (Gould & Scholz, 2007; Rehg, 2007; Sangiovanni & Viehoff, 2023), one common way to interpret it is as a unique form of cohesive bond. This bond generates obligations and commitments among agents to achieve a specific common good or set of interests that they acknowledge as valuable. However, it is important to note that pursuing these interests may come at a significant cost to some individuals (Mason, 1998, np). According to Taylor (2015, p. 133), members of solidary groups are not expected to have identical interests, of course. Rather, the point is that they must have a certain significant level of convergence to coordinate their actions and align their preferences toward achieving a common interest. Accordingly, it is often noted that robust solidaristic bonds tend to arise when members share certain identities, experiences, and/or political commitments (Blum, 2007). This often leads to a disposition to empathize with and mutually trust each other (Idem; Taylor, 2015; Gould, 2020). Bonds of solidarity, then, are rarely spontaneous, but created in the context of participating in the functioning of the group (Rehg, 2007, p. 15). Furthermore, the strength of solidary groups is often considered to be stronger when members are acquainted with each other (Blum, 2007, p. 57). It also increases when they understand their interests to be in opposition to those of other groups,xii or when they perceive themselves as being in a situation where they need to unite in the face of adversity (Ibid., p. 53; Sangiovanni, forthcoming) and/or fight against their oppression (Gould, 2020; Scholz, 2008). Of course, authors disagree on how to interpret the content and significance of these elements to achieve a correct understanding of solidarity. But they are usually considered to be its fundamental constituent features. I will therefore use them as a template to further theorize the issues that concern me here. How can this depiction help us flesh out plebeian constitutionalists' under-theorized concept of class solidarity, and why would class-specific LPIs enhance it and diminish their vulnerability to PIC? One preliminary comment concerns the nature of the class-based solidaristic bonds that nonwealthy, randomly selected representatives would hypothetically develop within class-specific LPIs. In general terms, we can say that these would constitute a mutual commitment and inclination to advocate for a specific set of shared class interests, even though that might sometimes involve a setback for their individual interests. This leads us to the first element that requires clarification, which is to define the content of such a set of class interests more accurately—that is, interests that refer to a set of things that would help the lives of those sharing similar class positions go collectively better and in the long run (Wright, 2000, p. 962). Probably due to the tendency of some (and, importantly, not all) Marxists to use the language of class interests, readers might get the impression that my account treats class interests in an overly substantive and moralized sense. For example, it may understand its ultimate goal as producing the conditions to "… free mankind from alienation" (Hochfeld, 1967, p. 13), including capitalist relations in general, and so on. Yet that is not required in the context of a plebeian constitutionalist account of class interests. First, it is important to acknowledge that the plebeian subject is highly diverse. It is reasonable to assume that their shared interests, including their class position, will also vary and sometimes be in conflict under socio-political conjunctures (McCarthy & Desan, 2023; Roberts, 2023). Therefore, assigning them a narrowly defined set of interests runs the risk of misrepresenting what can be expected of their collaboration. Second, it is important to emphasize that democratic forms of solidarity should involve individuals who possess a certain level of competence or authority in identifying and interpreting common goods (Rehg, 2007, p. 7). Therefore, the content of their shared interests should not be overly pre-determined as a matter of theory or abstracted from the social context in which they act (Fantasia, 1988, p. 11). That said, my view is that, if one accepts the diagnostic I have provided above, nonwealthy citizens should be conceived to be de facto politically disempowered, as well as systematically impoverished, as a result of oligarchic capture (Deveaux, 2021, p. 202)—a phenomenon that is uncontroversially against their interests and material wellbeing, collectively, and in the long run. Thus, I suggest that a satisfactory parameter to define the some content of plebeian class interests is that of advancing policies aimed at diminishing the causes and factors of reproduction of oligarchization—such as great inequalities of wealth and undemocratic institutional conditions—or, at least, not sacrificing their demands because they are said to be incompatible with the interests of wealthy groups. This means that, if class solidarity obtains among representatives, they should be reluctant to follow the interests of the wealthy to acquire future rewards, as well as to uncritically accept PIC-like mechanisms such as unqualified threats of significant capital flight whenever redistribution, or other pro-plebeian policies, are pursued. In other words, although they could fail to do so, lottocratic representatives engaging in class solidarity should more likely aim to erode the social conditions that lead to political oligarchization and decide to the benefit of the plebeian class. Let me now address the empirical claim that making LPIs decidedly class-specific would enhance class solidarity among lottocratic representatives. One first reason to give credence to the idea draws on evidence showing that non-wealthy citizens, especially those who identify themselves as such, are more likely to be motivated to oppose the dynamics that impoverish them (when compared to those who benefit from such dynamics) as well as tend to prefer more egalitarian economic policies (DiMaggio, 2015; Elsässer & Schäfer, 2022; Franko & Witko, 2023; Macdonald, 2019; Western, 1999). This means that they are more likely to pursue the set of class interests already stipulated by virtue of their class position simpliciter—meaning that one expects that institutions composed by members of this profile only would be increasingly anti-oligarchic too. Yet a second, more interesting hypothesis is to question why membership in explicitly class-specific institutions would plausibly enhance the awareness of non-wealthy citizens regarding their subordinated status and strengthen their solidary bonds. Even though most people are objectively disadvantaged within these systems, they often do not subjectively identify as such. As a result, this is, plausibly, one of the reasons why they do not engage in class solidarity or support egalitarian outcomes. Now, because contemporary democracies do not include empowered class-specific political institutions within their constitutional frameworks, this hypothesis cannot be tested in its original form. However, one way to illustrate the claim's plausibility is to draw analogies with other institutional platforms that involve class-specific criteria. This can help us understand whether these platforms enhance class solidarity bonds and how they do so. Let me elaborate on this by drawing an analogy to the case of workers' unions. As several recent studies show, societies with low levels of unionization are characterized by lower demands for redistribution, suggesting that higher unionization is causally linked to producing more egalitarian outcomes (Evans & Tilley, 2017; Farber et al., 2021; Frymer & Grumbach, 2021). Now, one