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Copyright © 2024 Association for the Academic Study of New Religions, Inc. 31 Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Volume 27, Issue 4, pages 31–52, ISSN 1092-6690 (print), 1541-8480 (electronic). New Religious Movements in Iran Determinants of Toleration and Repression by the State Ehsan Farshchi ABSTRACT: New religious movement activism can be perceived as a threat to mainstream order, sometimes resulting in repression by the state. New religions have become popular in Iran, a nation ruled by an absolute theocracy since 1979, yet the state appears to have tolerated the majority of new religious movements while repressing others. Through a comparative examination of the Islamic Republic of Iran's varying responses to the presence and activities of such movements, I present a model in which state repression is predicated on a movement's strength as measured by its access to resources vis- à- vis resource mobilization theory. Three characteristics—membership size, expansive geographical presence, and cultural proximity to the mainstream—seem to be the factors that differentiate repressed movements from tolerated ones. In addition, the comparison reveals that protests against state repression of a given movement reduce the severity of the state's actions against it. KEYWORDS: regulating religion, new religious movements, toleration, repression, resource mobilization, Islamic Republic of Iran A high level of tension between new religious movements and their social environments is a key feature that has been used to distinguish them from other types of religious organizations. 1 At the same time, stable domestic peace is a commonly desired social condition, and states are presumed to play a pivotal role in maintaining it. Considering the nature of new religious movements' relationships with their social environments and states' roles in maintaining domestic peace, the odds of contentious interactions between new religious movements and states are relatively high. The presence and activity of NR-27-4Text. indd 31 NR-27-4Text. indd 31 5/9/24 3: 33 PM 5/9/24 3: 33 PM Nova Religio 32 Copyright © 2024 Association for the Academic Study of New Religions, Inc. new religious movements loom especially large for governments that wield a firm grip on sociopolitical relations based on ideological or religious leanings. 2 In those contexts, due to overwhelming tension between a new religious movement and the state, it is expected that the state will take sweeping measures to put an end to the perceived challenges posed by the movement. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979–present), according to its constitution, became a theocracy after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The legal- political theory behind this system of theocracy, known as velayat-e faqih (authority of jurist), expanded the traditional authority of Twelver Shia faqihs (jurists) and, according to Iran's post- revolutionary constitution, granting a single member of faqihs, or a group of them, the right of overarching control of the state and the society. At the helm of the state is a faqih, an advanced Islamic scholar of the sources of religious law in Twelver Shia Islam in Iran—officially known as the Leader or the Leader of the Islamic Revolution (often called the Supreme Leader in English media) —who is elected for a lifetime term by eighty- eight members of the Assembly of Experts, who are themselves faqihs and are approved to participate in election for the assembly by a Guardian Council consisting of twelve members, of which six jurists are appointed by the Leader and six constitutional law attorneys nominated by the head of judiciary and approved by the parliament. As a result, Iran's religious landscape hardly fits with the characteristics of the religious marketplace model developed by sociologists in western countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran has effectively, and oftentimes forcefully, repressed dissent from its narrowly defined norms; but since the revolution, citizens' attempts to breach socio- cultural barriers and limitations have manifested in different forms. Some of the grievances that motivated popular protests—such as the Woman, Life, Freedom movement that broke out after the September 2022 arrest, beating, and subsequent death of Mahsa Zhina Amini (1999–2022) for wearing improper clothing (yoga pants and open- front manteau) —are expressions of dissent from imposed restrictive lifestyles. The popularity of new. . .
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