False Authorities

An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others if they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call epistemic quacks , who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and epistemic charlatans, i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Neither type of false authority covers what Lackey (2021) calls predatory experts : experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic status as a cover for predatory behavior. Qua experts, predatory experts are competent and thus could (and maybe sometimes do) help their clients. But should we count them as genuine epistemic authorities? No. I argue that they are false epistemic authorities because in addition to their practical and moral misconduct, such experts systematically deceive their clients, thereby thwarting the clients’ epistemic ends.