Models of the Stackelberg Game for Progressive Pricing of Urban On-Street Parking Lots

This paper establishes the Stackelberg three-party game model of on-street parking price to solve the specific pricing strategy problem of on-street parking lots in a single city. In the model, the government acts as the leader to decide the parking price strategy, while the long-time parkers and short-time parkers act as the followers, deciding whether to park or not according to the price and their own utility, thus forming a tripartite game system. The model, through in-depth analysis of the utility function and response strategy of each participant, designs the functional expression of the progressive billing strategy, aiming to find the equilibrium point between the government's pricing strategy and the parkers' behavior, in order to further solve the parameters in the government's pricing strategy, and arrive at the optimal price of the parking lot balancing the interests of all parties, which provides a specific pricing basis for the system to formulate the pricing scheme of the on-street parking in a piece of the urban area.