South Korean Entanglement in a Taiwan Contingency

South Korean Entanglement in a Taiwan Contingency Peter K. Lee (bio) What would the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) do in the event of a war between the United States and China over Taiwan? Until recently, successive South Korean administrations had assiduously insisted that their primary concern during any cross-strait conflict would be the clear and present danger posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). For policymakers in Seoul, the priority has been ensuring that North Korea does not use a cross-strait conflict as an opportunity to conduct military provocations on the Korean Peninsula or even open a second front in a wider regional war. But increasing fears of a U.S.-China conflict sometime this decade have led South Korean leaders to begin mentioning for the first time the "importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" in joint statements with the United States.1 Like many of Asia's middle powers, especially those that are U.S. treaty allies, South Korea is beginning to consider the possibility of entrapment in a Taiwan contingency. This essay argues that, rather than deliberate entrapment by the United States to join in a military defense of Taiwan, South Korea faces a far greater risk of entanglement in the conflict during an escalation in fighting. The ROK's status as a U.S. treaty ally hosting 28,500 U.S. troops and major U.S. military installations, as well as geographic proximity to key transit routes for incoming U.S. forces, means that the country is likely to become drawn into most conflict scenarios. Nonetheless, South Korea has the agency to decide the degree of its involvement, which could entail total neutrality, partial neutrality, partial involvement, direct intervention, or horizontal counterescalation. Unfinished Hot Wars from the Cold War During the Cold War, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam were the United States' three front-line Asian allies. All three also happened to be divided states seeking to reunify their countries. South Korea and Taiwan, End Page 20 in particular, were active in trying to build a multilateral security alliance.2 Taiwan president Chiang Kai-shek's offer to send 33,000 troops to join the Korean War and ROK president Park Chung-hee's deployment of over 300,000 troops to South Vietnam reflected their shared commitment to defeating Communism. But the United States' adoption of a hub-and-spokes alliance system in the 1950s meant that the strategic linkages between its allies, including between South Korea and Taiwan, remained limited and mediated.3 U.S.-China diplomatic normalization during the 1970s, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the end of the Cold War, and South Korea's transfer of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China in 1992 marked the erosion of ideological solidarity. For many South Koreans, therefore, limited national interests are at stake in a Taiwan contingency today. Despite South Korea's and Taiwan's enduring national division, mutual dominance of the world's semiconductor industry and advanced manufacturing, and geostrategic proximity of less than a thousand kilometers between each other, their bilateral relationship has faded in importance.4 Going to war against China to defend Taiwan, even as part of a U.S.-led coalition, is inconceivable for many South Korean experts and officials.5 The legacy of the hub-and-spokes alliance system is that South Korea has not had to factor the defense of other U.S. allies into its strategic planning. The raison d'etre of the ROK-U.S. alliance is to deter North Korea. The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 explicitly restricts the scope of mutual assistance to "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective End Page 21 administrative control."6 Based on a textualist reading, this would exclude a Chinese attack on U.S. forces around Taiwan. This differs from the U.S. treaties with Australia and the Philippines that cover "an armed attack…on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."7 As such, many South Korean experts contend that any military operation...