The Pythagorean Argument of the Intelligent Design of the Universe and Its Critique. Part 3: Philosophers’ Objections

The article is devoted to a critique of the Pythagorean argument, explicit and implicit, offered by philosophers of different epochs. We begin with Kant’s “critique of the physicotheological argument”, finding not a refutation of the argument, but a mixture of support and fair remarks removed by the further development of physics. We next assess objections to the Pythagorean argument which may be called “downplaying” emphasizing the incompleteness of physical conceptions of the world. We note that, despite this incompleteness, the cosmic scope and incredible precision of knowledge of modern physics require an explanation of why this turned out to be possible. Another variant of the downplay is connected with the negative attitude to the fruits of the “Pythagorean faith”, with the possibility of rejecting it according to the pragmatic criterion. We noted that, as far as we know, none of the adherents of this retrograde position have answered the question about the reason for the effectiveness of mathematics in cognition of the universe, whether the fruits of this cognition are good or not. A number of attempts to explain this efficiency are associated with a sort of omnipotence attributed to an aspect of cognition. Karl Popper suggested that the effectiveness of the language of mathematics is not surprising, because languages are generally effective in describing reality. Anatoly Akhutin explained the success of mathematical physics by the fact that mathematized methodology was originally incorporated into physics, ‘what we put in, we get out’. Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Andrei Rodin deduced the success of physics from the general way of progress. Noting the inadequacy of such explanations, we tried to respond to them correctly. One more direction of criticism of the Pythagorean argument is connected with ethical, political and politically-correct requirements of strict observance of the boundary between the ‘magisteria’ of science and religion, inadmissibility of its crossing. Our response consists in pointing out the incompatibility of such a ‘Chinese wall’ with the task of philosophical reflection of scientifi c cognition and developing a meaningful worldview. The article then moves on to a series of remarks that may seem relevant without actually being so. Finally, the role of irrational motivations in solving metaphysical problems is considered.