Nagorny Karabakh — 2023: Problems of International Legal Qualification

The Second Karabakh War of 2020, which ended with the defeat of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and Armenia supporting it, reversed the balance of power but did not resolve the conflict. The absolute superiority of Azerbaijan — both military and political, the insufficient clarity of the Statement of 9 November, the remaining contradictions between the parties — all this created the preconditions for the Third War, which began on 19 September 2023 and lasted only one day. The eventual defeat of the NKR and the transfer of the entire region under Azerbaijani jurisdiction, however, does not appear to be the final point: Azerbaijan demands the eight occupied villages and insists on the extraterritoriality of the Zangezur corridor. This article continues an article published in 2021 and dedicated to the legal aspects of the 2020 conflict. The author describes developments after 2020; analyses the use of force and assesses new interpretations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; gives qualification to the blockade of the Lachin corridor and the Armenian exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020; examines some aspects of the right to self-determination that became relevant in 2023; defines the remaining territorial disputes; and assesses the effectiveness of the settlement formats. In legal terms, the 2023 conflict significantly improved the position of Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh; in the final analysis, it can be argued that the blockade and the 19 September attack created the preconditions for a remedial secession, the realisation of which, however, is unrealistic. Some of the new qualifications are based on scientific hypotheses that reflect progressive trends in the development of law rather than being an established element of it. Politically, on the contrary, the conflict has seriously worsened Armenia’s situation. There are several scenarios for the development of events. The first assumes the satisfaction of all Azerbaijan’s claims and Armenia’s transition to a subordinate position; the second — modification of the status quo through compromise regimes built on the basis of mutual respect and equality; the third — restoration of the status quo as it existed or should have existed at the time of the collapse of the USSR. This scenario seems realistic and fair; its realisation, however, is impossible without the participation of external actors: Russia, Iran, Turkey, the West, the US and China. Unfortunately, the position of these actors is not consolidated, while the Caucasus is still perceived as a peripheral region unworthy of the attention paid to some other regions.