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The article is devoted to the little-studied problems of the history of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 – the military and political strategy of the top leadership of the Russian Empire and the commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army, General-in-Chief Prince A. M. Golitsyn towards the Principality of Moldavia in the initial period of the conflict, during the campaign of 1769. Flaws in the organization of strategic planning on the Russian side, the absence of a pre-developed war plan, deficiencies in the supply system of troops and the inability to use an artillery siege park significantly limited the effectiveness of Golitsyn’s operations on the upper Dniester, which was reflected in two unsuccessful attempts by the Russian army to take the fortress of Khotyn in April and July 1769. For political and psychological reasons, this undermined Golitsyn’s credibility at the imperial court and led to his removal from the post of commander-in-chief, however, it was Golitsyn’s pragmatic defensive strategy that allowed him to defeat the main forces of the Ottoman army in late August – early September 1769 and force them to retreat from most of the territory of Moldova. Simultaneously with the conduct of military operations, A. M. Golitsyn and the commander of the vanguard corps of the 1st Army, Major General Prince A. A. Prozorovsky actively engaged, largely on their own initiative, in establishing secret intelligence and political contacts with representatives of the highest boyars and clergy of Moldova. Their success in this activity, as well as the recruitment of Arnaut formations from local natives to the Russian service, largely paved the way for the rapid and successful occupation of most of Moldavia by Russian troops in the autumn of 1769. The article is based on previously little-known archival material, mostly on the official correspondence of the Russian command.
Vasiliy B. Kashirin (Thu,) studied this question.