Exploring Concepts of Action, Motives, and Intention in Nursing Through Anscombe's Philosophy

Nursing ethics has long drawn on established frameworks such as principlism, care ethics, and relational approaches to guide practice. While these models provide valuable direction, they often overlook how the intentional structure of action shapes ethical meaning in clinical encounters. This article argues that Anscombe's philosophy, particularly her work on intention and action, offers the conceptual tools to enrich nursing ethics by grounding moral significance in action‐guiding reasoning. Although her work has not been widely applied to nursing, it offers substantial potential to enhance ethical decision‐making, patient‐centered care, and holistic support. Drawing on her seminal text, Intention (1957), this paper examines Anscombe's concepts of intention, motives, and the distinction between intentional and non‐intentional actions, as well as intentional omissions. These ideas provide a foundation for understanding intention as action‐guiding reasoning rather than an internal mental state, an approach that deepens ethical reflection and promotes more intentional, virtuous nursing care. The paper also addresses Anscombe's rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, a distinction famously articulated by Hume (2022/1739), who argued that moral values cannot be derived from observable facts alone. Instead, Anscombe maintains that ethical meaning is embedded in the description of intentional action, a view that, when extended to nursing, offers a fresh perspective for clinical decision‐making. Through applications to ethical dilemmas, communication, and holistic care, it Anscombe's philosophical perspective can enrich nursing and foster morally meaningful, intention‐based practice that upholds both patient autonomy and professional integrity. This paper is organized into key sections addressing motives and action, intentional omissions, the fact/value distinction, clinical decision‐making, communication, and holistic support.