Freedom of Self-Expression

Abstract Freedom of self-expression is an elusive value. In ordinary political discourse, the value of self-expression seems obvious. But it is surprisingly difficult to specify freedom of self-expression without collapsing it into the value of freedom in general. And reducing freedom of self-expression to a special case of freedom of speech yields a Procrustean and underinclusive account. This paper develops a novel account of freedom of self-expression which avoids both pitfalls. First, I show that the ubiquity of self-expression as a phenomenon is compatible with the normative distinctiveness of freedom of self-expression as a value. Second, I show that freedom of self-expression requires, at minimum, freedom from content-based limitations on the exercise of personal style. Third, I ground the moral significance of freedom of self-expression in two distinct interests: in autonomy of self-definition , and in opportunities for recognition. Ultimately, freedom of self-expression emerges as a distinct and coherent moral and political value.