New surplus value demonstrates stability in coalition structure for cooperative games, suggesting better player engagement.
A coalition structure is a partition of a player set, and different partitions may have a certain effect on the value for a cooperative game. Thus, an unreasonable value may affect the enthusiasm of players in a cooperative game with coalition structure. In this study, considering the stability of coalition structure, we propose a new value based on the grand surplus value (i.e., surplus Owen value). Following the ESL value for a cooperative game, a generalized form of surplus Owen value is also given and characterized. The surplus Owen value and its generalized form are both extensions of the Owen value, which provides a certain decision-making basis for the formation of coalition structure.
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Yu et al. (2025) studied this question.
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