This article examines the evolution of approaches to the development and implementation of socio-economic policy in the USSR during the period 1930–1936, offering a critical reassessment of the traditional Soviet-era thesis that emphasised the scientific planning and successful execution of the five-year plans, along with sectoral and regional development. Over the past three decades, this thesis has been subject to significant critique, which complicates the understanding of the origins and dynamics of changes in the management of the Soviet industrial project. A key question remains: how did the USSR’s managerial corps manage to execute the industrialisation objectives of the first pre-war five-year plans, thus creating a military-industrial capacity capable of resisting Nazi Germany and its allies? The article addresses this question through an exploration of the role played by the All-Union Meetings of business executives between 1931 and 1936, highlighting how their decisions influenced the development and implementation of socio-economic programmes. It is argued that these meetings introduced key provisions into Soviet economic theory, which became the foundation for future reforms, including the State Programme for the Compulsory Technical Training of Workers, initiated in 1936. Additionally, the article explores the interaction between the party-state elite and the directorate, emphasising the degree of support from Soviet leadership for a more rational economic course during this period. Drawing on both published and archival sources, it concludes that the materials from party forums (1930–1935) reveal the capacity of Soviet elites to move away from the most extreme elements of the radical course of the Great Turning Point.
Mikhail Feldman (Wed,) studied this question.