Analysis reveals that opportunity cost affects choice dynamics, suggesting utility maximisation is complex and influenced by rationality.
We define the (physical) opportunity cost of a choice x as the alternative that would be chosen if x were not available, and the opportunity cost of any unchosen alternative as x itself. The agent has preferences over pairs consisting of alternatives and their opportunity costs. Because costs affect choice and vice-versa, choice results from an intrapersonal equilibrium rather than from simple maximisation. In spite of significant rationality assumptions, the resulting behaviour can be highly non-standard, allowing intransitive choices. Rational utility maximisation is ensured by an additional new consistency condition on preferences. However, we argue that the maximised utility cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as a welfare relevant “revealed preference”. A generalisation of our model accommodates additional departures from standard rationality in the form of menu effects.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Levent Ülkü (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: