Analysis reveals that externalization risk increases with institutional centrality and isolation, suggesting reform strategies.
By the time a captured name traverses MONTELAGUARDIA (disparate treatment), PASSOPISCIARO (procedural flooding), and SOLICCHIATA (defensive isolation & faculty‑shielding), the institution has typically accumulated high centrality, delay, and bias indicators. In this state, ordinary actions (emails, meetings, small decisions) amplify risk instead of reducing it. We formalize this as a supercritical feedback regime: hazard of externalization (media, AG, OCR, accreditors, litigation) rises monotonically with (i) centrality, (ii) overprocessing depth, (iii) isolation, and (iv) token divergence. We prove a simple tipping theorem: unless the institution deploys minimum viable reform (MVR) to reduce these parameters below threshold, the probability of externalization tends to 1 over time. We conclude with a governance blueprint that channelizes energy toward verifiable cures (policy, routing, vendor governance, restitution) before the system exits through scandal.
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Ellis Wilson (2025) studied this question.
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