What are delusions? Are they beliefs? Imaginations? Acceptances? Feelings? Mere utterances? Ideas? The doxasticism debate seems to presuppose the existence of a determinate answer: delusions are either beliefs, imaginations, acceptances, mere utterances or something else entirely. Against this, I argue that delusions, considered as a whole, do not necessarily fall into any one of these categories, and further that individual delusions may manifest in different categories at different times. I use the phrase ‘modes of delusionality’ to refer to the different forms of expression that delusions oscillate between. While I critique the setup of the debate, I nonetheless contend it is a productive line of inquiry, for the status of delusions—if they are beliefs or not—bears greatly on how we conceive of them, and how we approach therapeutic strategies.
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Oliver Clark (2025) studied this question.
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