Abstract This article presents an analysis of Russian behavior as an international mediator in conflicts of the post-Soviet space: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and Ukraine. Drawing upon theoretical tools from mediation studies, we argue that Russia can be qualified as a “principal” mediator, projecting interests and power in the studied conflicts. It has been accepted as such on various occasions. On others, however, Russia failed to work for solutions acceptable to the conflicting parties, instead pursuing an outcome favorable to itself, and thus becoming a de-facto party to the conflicts. The complex set-up of multi-party mediation formats, led by international organizations, has locked-in the Russian role as a co-mediator without creating incentives for it to actively pursue conflict settlement. Beyond the positive Russian role in containing violence in the region in the 1990s, globally, the Russian involvement in mediation has not been effective.
Emilija Pundziūtė‐Gallois (Sat,) studied this question.