Application servers are traditionally the policy enforcement point for databases. In that model, the database cannot verify the end user’s identity or intent for each operation; it can only trust whatever context the application supplies. This creates systemic exposure to server compromise, confused-deputy problems, and weak provenance. DB-EUA moves verifiable authorization into the data path: every create/read/update/delete (CRUD) is accompanied by a user-authenticated, cryptographically verifiable token that the database (or a hardened database proxy) validates and binds to the session executing the SQL. The result is a tamper-evident, user-attributable audit trail and strong least-privilege enforcement at the DB layer—aligned with Zero Trust principles and regulatory accountability requirements. We present: A precise threat model and trust assumptions. A two-token architecture (server channel token + per-user operation token). A reference implementation blueprint for PostgreSQL Row-Level Security (RLS) with a wire-protocol proxy. Hardening guidance (key management, mTLS, channel binding, log hygiene). Compliance mappings (HIPAA, SOX, GDPR, CCPA) and a summary matrix. A practical vendor roadmap (DB engines, cloud DBs, gateway/proxy vendors, backend platforms).
Bhattacharya et al. (Sun,) studied this question.
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