Electric vehicles (EVs) are pivotal for enhancing the flexibility of power systems, with vehicle-grid integration (VGI) constituting the fundamental mechanism for their participation in grid regulation. VGI relies on multi-source information from EVs, charging infrastructure, traffic network, power grid, and meteorology. However, ineffective data integration mechanisms have resulted in data silos, which impede the realization of synergistic value from multi-source data fusion. To address these issues, this paper develops a quadripartite evolutionary game model that incorporates data providers, data users, government, and data service platforms, overcoming the limitation of traditional tripartite models in fully capturing the complete data value chain. The model systematically examines the cost–benefit dynamics and strategy evolution among stakeholders throughout the data-sharing process. Leveraging evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability criteria, sensitivity analyses were conducted on key parameters, including data costs and government subsidies, on the MATLAB platform. Results indicate that multi-source data integration accelerates system convergence and facilitates a multi-party equilibrium. Government subsidies as well as reward and punishment mechanisms emerge as critical drivers of sharing, with an identified subsidy threshold of εS = 0.02 for triggering multi-source integration. These key factors can also accelerate system convergence by up to 79% through enhanced subsidies (e.g., reducing stabilization time from 0.29 to 0.06). Importantly, VGI data sharing represents a non-zero-sum game. Well-designed institutional frameworks can achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for all parties, providing quantitatively supported strategies for constructing incentive-compatible mechanisms.
Zhong et al. (Wed,) studied this question.