This paper documents the convergent ownership structure across multiple regulated industries, revealing a previously underexamined pattern of market concentration. Through systematic analysis of ownership data across seven major sectors—pharmaceuticals, food processing (meat and grain), tobacco, alcohol, automotive, and agricultural inputs (seeds)—we identify a common structural feature: the dominance of three asset management firms (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, collectively "Big Three") as the largest shareholders across ostensibly competing firms in each sector. We extend Eisenhower's "Military-Industrial Complex" framework to propose a generalized "Regulatory-Industrial Complex" model, demonstrating structural isomorphism across military, financial, health, and regulatory domains. Critically, we argue this concentration does not require conspiracy or coordination; rather, it emerges from incentive structures that naturally select for configurations that fragment accountability while concentrating benefits. This analysis has implications for antitrust policy, democratic governance, and the political economy of regulation.
Ryuhei ISHIBASHI (Wed,) studied this question.