This paper argues that Hanlon's Razor fails when applied to financial crises. The systematic erosion of regulatory constraints that precedes major financial collapses cannot be adequately explained by stupidity, incompetence, or ignorance. We demonstrate structural parallels between financial crises and international conflicts: both generate concentrated benefits for specific actors while distributing costs broadly; both are preceded by intentional dismantling of stabilizing constraints; both follow predictable cycles of buildup, crisis, and reconstruction that benefit the same parties. Drawing on Stigler's (1971) theory of regulatory capture, Olson's (1965) logic of collective action, and documented evidence from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), we show that destabilizing conditions are not accidental but structurally maintained because they serve identifiable interests. The parallel extends to justificatory narratives: 'national security' legitimizes military expenditure while 'market efficiency' legitimizes financial deregulation. Neither stupidity nor conspiracy adequately explains these patterns. What explains them is incentive structure: individual rationality producing collective catastrophe through mechanisms that benefit those who design and maintain them. This is not a conspiracy theory but a structural analysis. The conclusion is uncomfortable: financial crises, like wars, may be features rather than bugs of the current system.
Ryuhei ISHIBASHI (2026) studied this question.