This article examines the convergence of economic cooperation and rearmament between two Atlantic institutions, suggesting significant bureaucratic impacts.
At the beginning of the 1950s, two Atlantic institutions, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), converged and nearly merged over the issues of economic co-operation and rearmament. This article seeks to explore this process ›inside-out‹, from the perspective of the international officials and diplomats who executed it. It demonstrates how the OEEC Secretariat, under the leadership of Secretary-General Robert Marjolin, managed to prevent the organisation from being absorbed by the military alliance; and, in turn, infused the NATO Secretariat with its bureaucratic procedures and economic competences.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ikonomou et al. (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: