ABSTRACT Political compromises are common. Parties that seek to influence society must inevitably make them. Populists often criticize such compromises, as compromising implies that an ideal outcome will not be achieved. In general, political compromises evoke strong emotions, particularly when they are perceived as problematic—morally or otherwise. In this paper, I will examine whether the moral norms that govern compromise are specific to it. I evaluate Fabian Wendt's view that “deontic restrictions”—limits on what we are morally permitted to do—are not specific to the morality of compromise. I offer critical remarks on Wendt's argument, though I do not claim that his position fails. However, I argue that there is a sense in which the rules of compromise are specific. When compromises are regarded as morally bad, certain moral norms play a particularly prominent role. These norms are more frequently invoked than others and, in this respect, function as specific rules that mark the limits of compromise.
Juha Räikkä (Fri,) studied this question.