Parliamentary Supremacy Against Judicial Review in Ghana and the Uk

This thesis undertakes a comprehensive comparative examination of the constitutional tension between parliamentary supremacy and judicial review in Ghana and the United Kingdom, two jurisdictions sharing a common law heritage but exhibiting fundamentally different constitutional architectures. While the United Kingdom traditionally embodies a model of parliamentary sovereignty rooted in an uncodified constitution and political constitutionalism, Ghana operates under a written constitution that explicitly entrenches constitutional supremacy and empowers courts to invalidate legislative acts inconsistent with constitutional norms. The study interrogates the historical evolution, doctrinal foundations, and contemporary manifestations of parliamentary authority and judicial oversight in both jurisdictions. It critically assesses whether parliamentary supremacy remains viable in modern constitutional democracies characterised by rights-based adjudication, judicial assertiveness, and increasing demands for constitutional accountability. Particular attention is paid to the impact of landmark constitutional developments, including the Human Rights Act 1998, Brexit-era jurisprudence in the United Kingdom, and post-1992 constitutional adjudication in Ghana. Adopting a doctrinal, comparative, and normative methodology, the thesis analyses leading judicial decisions, constitutional texts, and scholarly debates to evaluate how courts in both jurisdictions negotiate the boundaries of legislative power. It reveals that while UK courts formally uphold parliamentary sovereignty, they have progressively expanded judicial influence through interpretative techniques, constitutional principles, and rights-based reasoning. In contrast, Ghana’s Supreme Court exercises strong-form judicial review as a constitutionally mandated mechanism for enforcing constitutional supremacy, reflecting a deliberate post-authoritarian design choice. The thesis argues that neither absolute parliamentary supremacy nor unchecked judicial dominance offers a satisfactory constitutional model. Instead, it advances a normative framework that reconceptualises the relationship between legislatures and courts as one of principled constitutional balance, shaped by historical context, institutional capacity, and democratic maturity. By offering context-sensitive reform proposals for both jurisdictions, the study contributes original insights to comparative constitutional law, parliamentary theory, and debates on judicial legitimacy in contemporary democracies.