A Chancy Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy

Metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) is indeterminacy originating in the nonrepresentational world. I develop a theory of MI in terms of objective chance with a number of attractive features: it provides a reductive analysis of MI; it applies at both macroscopic and microscopic scales; it demystifies the target phenomenon by employing no special‐purpose metaphysical primitives; it does not prejudge the question whether the logic of a language capable of describing an indeterminate subject matter is classical, or whether its semantics is bivalent; it comes with built‐in epistemic criteria informed by a naturalistic methodology. The chancy account is compared to three salient alternatives: the Third‐Way View, which postulates the existence of indeterminate propositions; Metaphysical Supervaluationism, which takes indeterminacy to be a metaphysical primitive; and the Determinable‐Based Account, which reduces the target phenomenon to patterns of determinables and determinates. It is argued that the chancy account fares better overall when tested against two paradigmatic case studies: future indeterminacy, and quantum indeterminacy. Applications to further domains are also sketched, and a number of open problems outlined.