Suffering as Transindividuation: Wittgenstein, Simondon, Nietzsche

The relevance of the research is determined by the crisis of traditional discursive models of ethics in an era when the experience of trauma, vulnerability, and radical otherness demands a response that exceeds the possibilities of rational argumentation. The growing interest in the issues of affect, bodily experience, and nonverbal communication in social and humanitarian sciences makes it necessary to seek ontological grounds for intersubjective connections that cannot be reduced to linguistic conventions. The proposed synthesis responds to the demand both from contemporary philosophy, which seeks to overcome the Cartesian gap between mind and body, and from practices of solidarity and care, which seek a theoretical understanding of their pre-reflexive dimension. Drawing upon the synthesis of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Simondon's ontology, and Nietzsche's ethics, we assert that a genuine ethical act arises not from moral judgment but from an immediate bodily response to the suffering of the "Other" understood as a tension in a common transindividual field. The study is based on a method of conceptual synthesis aimed at constructing a holistic model of affective ethics through the integration of the ideas of late Wittgenstein, Simondon, and Nietzsche. The conceptual reconstruction explicates, followed by a comparison, key categories such as "form of life" and "language game," "pre-individual field" and "transduction," as well as Nietzsche's central ethical distinction between passive compassion-pity and active involvement-compassion. Problem-oriented comparative analysis reveals points of conceptual convergence and hidden polemics among thinkers, while hermeneutic work with texts ensures the authenticity of interpretation. The novelty of the work lies in the original synthesis of three key philosophical traditions: late Wittgensteinianism, Simondonian process ontology, and Nietzschean genealogy of morals, to construct a coherent concept of affective ethics. For the first time, the concept of the "transindividual field" is applied for the ontological grounding of Wittgenstein's thesis on the primacy of pre-linguistic response to suffering. A theoretical distinction is introduced and developed between passive affective resonance-pity and active resonance-involvement, allowing for a reformulation of Nietzsche's critique of compassion into a positive program of ethics of affirmative becoming. As a result, not only is a new interpretation of individual authors proposed, but also a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding the ethical as an immanent process of affective transduction that precedes and conditions any linguistic articulation of morality.