This dissertation deals with the changes in social policy coordination at the European level brought about by the growth strategy ‘Europe 2020’ and the ‘European Semester’. It aims at assessing the repercussions of this governance structure for domestic welfare states. The main assumption is that the increasing entanglement of thematic coordination, macroeconomic coordination and fiscal surveillance at the European level limits member states’ authority to pursue an independent social policy, as it necessitates particular social policy reforms at the national level that are in line with EU recommendations. The study first investigates what kinds of domestic social policy reforms the European Commission and the Council propose. The comprehensive content analysis of country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the social field from 2011–2016 demonstrates that social concerns were subordinated to the European Semester’s overarching aim to stabilise the Economic and Monetary Union. Next, the study addresses the question of to what extent member states actually implement EU recommendations for social and employment policy reforms. Analysis of the Commission‘s country reports shows that domestic implementation of EU reform proposals varies considerably across particular member states—with some appearing as ‘reform pioneers’ and others as ‘reform deniers’. Following on from these findings, the study addresses the question of why the implementation of CSRs differs across member states. For this purpose, a qualitative comparative analysis considers the relationship between a high level of acceptance of EU recommendations in the member states and the presence of possible influencing factors. The comparison finds that the existence of a multi-annual excessive deficit procedure in a given member state can be regarded as a sufficient condition for high policy acceptance. Finally, the study further examines the mechanism of operation behind this hypothesis using the cases of Germany and France as examples of contrasting responsiveness to the EU input in the social sphere. This in-depth comparison shows that the reasons for high policy responsiveness can be found in the interplay of a state's economic vulnerability and the sanction regime of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. It becomes evident here that the enforcement mechanisms of EU socio-economic governance unfold their effect above all in economically vulnerable states. Countries in a good economic position—like Germany—have little incentive to tackle reform recommendations that may be necessary but unwelcome in political terms.
Anders Martin Paul Hentschel (Mon,) studied this question.