Research on Decision-Making Coordination of Green Supply Chain Based on Carbon Trading

To achieve the “dual carbon” goals, the carbon trading mechanism has emerged as a pivotal market-based instrument to incentivize corporate emission reductions. This paper introduces the carbon trading mechanism into a green supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers, aiming to investigate the decision-making coordination issues within this framework. By constructing a Stackelberg game model, the study comparatively analyzes the equilibrium outcomes under both centralized and decentralized decision-making modes, and further explores the impact of carbon trading prices through numerical simulations. The findings reveal that: firstly, decentralized decision-making leads to efficiency losses in the supply chain system, and these losses are exacerbated by higher carbon prices; secondly, rising carbon prices asymmetrically affect the profits of supply chain members, with manufacturers benefiting from the direct sale of surplus carbon quotas, while retailers experience profit compression due to increased wholesale prices. The study indicates that while the carbon trading mechanism stimulates emission reduction efforts, it also intensifies internal conflicts of interest within the supply chain. This research provides a theoretical explanation for understanding decision-making conflicts in supply chains under carbon policies and offers managerial insights for enterprises to manage carbon assets and promote collaborative emission reductions.