Free will discourse is primarily centred around the thesis of determinism. Much of the literature takes determinism as its starting premise, assuming it true “for the sake of discussion”, and then proceeds to present arguments for why, if determinism is true, free will would be either possible or impossible. This is reflected in the theoretical terrain of the debate, with the primary distinction currently being between compatibilists and incompatibilists and not, as one might expect, between free will realists and skeptics. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that there is no reason to accept such a framing. We show that, on the basis of modern physics, there is no good evidence that physical determinism (of any variety) provides an accurate description of our universe and lots of evidence against such a view. Moreover, we show that this analysis extends equally to the sort of ‘indeterministic’ worldviews endorsed by many libertarian philosophers (and their skeptics) – a worldview which we refer to as determinism-plus-randomness. The paper’s secondary aim is therefore to present an alternative conception of indeterminism, which is more in line with the empirical evidence from physics. It is this indeterministic worldview, we suggest, that ought to be the central focus of a reframed philosophy of free will.
Potter et al. (2026) studied this question.