Hume and Searle – the is/ought gap vs. speech act theory

John Searle notoriously rejected a basic logical point – the affirmation of the so-called ‘is-ought’ gap – made by Hume at a strategic stage of the Treatise, Book III. The aim of my paper is to understand some major differences, which derive from that basic disagreement, between these two philosophers. I discuss certain fundamental notions of social and political philosophy in relation to their opposition regarding that basic logical point. I take account of the fact that an analysis of promises features prominently in Searle (in Speech Acts) as well as in Hume (in Treatise III.ii.5). The paradigmatic speech acts that promises are – with the obligation to realize what one promised – have an important role in understanding political obligation more generally. So it is necessary to understand how promises function within these two different accounts – the differences being articulated here against the background of the disagreement over the logical issue.