Dynamic Game Modeling and DNAS² Framework for Dual-S Security in Internet of Vehicles

Security is paramount for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), leading to the proposal of the “Dual S” architecture integrating functional safety and cybersecurity. However, the complex interplay—encompassing resource competition, conflictual cooperation, and interaction—between these two domains lacks a rigorous analytical framework. To bridge this gap, this paper introduces “DNAS²,” a novel game-theoretic model for IoV security. DNAS² comprises two interconnected components: (1) an internal cooperative game that formalizes the “S² Alliance,” where collective rationality supersedes individual interests. We provide a solution method for allocation equilibrium, proving it drives the endogenous security system toward Pareto optimality. (2) an external non-cooperative attack-defense game that accounts for dynamic adversarial strategies and information asymmetry. For this model, we derive equilibrium solutions that furnish the mathematical foundation for optimal defense strategies and payoff predictions. Our work provides a unified analytical tool for optimizing IoV security design. Future research will focus on model refinement and extension to evolutionary game scenarios.