Incentive Strategies and Dynamic Game Analysis for Supply Chain Quality Governance from the Perspective of Agricultural Product Liability

Background: From the perspective of product liability, this study explores how agricultural product e-commerce enterprises can enhance the quality of the agricultural product supply chain through quality incentive strategies. Methods: Based on a tripartite evolutionary game model, the strategic interactions among farmers, agricultural product e-commerce enterprises, and the government are analyzed. Results: The research finds that whether the system converges to the ideal equilibrium of “high-quality production—ex-ante quality cost-sharing—collaborative governance” depends on the combined effects of revenue distribution, liability costs, and external incentives or penalties. Among these, government-led collaborative governance plays a key guiding role in incentivizing enterprises and influencing farmers’ behaviors. The incentive measures implemented by e-commerce enterprises and government penalties can effectively curb farmers’ low-quality production behaviors. Conclusions: The study further reveals how factors such as ex-ante cost-sharing, liability allocation, and farmers’ conformity psychology affect the stability of agricultural product supply chain quality, thereby providing theoretical support for constructing a “policy-platform-farmer” collaborative governance framework.