The right to a fair trial constitutes a foundational element of criminal jurisprudence and operates as an indispensable safeguard for the protection of individual liberty within constitutional democracies. This doctoral study undertakes a critical and comparative examination of the right to fair trial as developed and enforced in India and the United Kingdom. The research analyzes the normative foundations, constitutional positioning, statutory frameworks, and judicial interpretations governing fair trial guarantees in both jurisdictions. In India, the right has been judicially constructed through an expansive interpretation of Articles 14, 20, 21, and 22 of the Constitution, transforming procedural law into a rights-oriented framework under the doctrine of substantive due process. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s fair trial regime is primarily anchored in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and supplemented by common law principles and statutory procedural safeguards. The study evaluates core components of the fair trial standard, including the presumption of innocence, equality of arms, access to legal representation, protection against self-incrimination, and the right to a trial within a reasonable time. It further interrogates systemic and structural challenges affecting the practical realization of these rights, such as judicial delay, constraints on legal aid, and procedural complexity. By adopting a comparative doctrinal and analytical methodology, the research highlights both convergence and divergence in the conceptualization and implementation of fair trial standards and argues that the effective enforcement of this right depends not merely on normative recognition but on institutional capacity, procedural efficiency, and sustained legal reform.
Ruthramoorthy et al. (2026) studied this question.