This paper develops an original ontological model of the end of human knowledge grounded in two absolute and opposed cognitive faculties: absolute understanding (alfahm), conceived as a mental force, and absolute imagination/judgment (al-khayal), conceived as a mental action. Drawing on a distinction derived from Qur'anic conceptual vocabulary — between al-mustaqarr (the Stable: the irreducible real) and al-mustawda' (the repository) — the model proposes that while the real content of each cognitive faculty is irreducible and untransferable, the repositories (almustawda'at) of all philosophical traditions are collectable and unifiable. Four foundational theses are advanced: (1) Temporality belongs to understanding, not to imagination; (2) Every absolute is indivisible in itself, yet its manifestations fragment into discrete meaning quanta (takmîm), analogous to quantization in physics; (3) The first human possessed near-absolute understanding with wholly fragmented imagination, while the last human will possess absolute imagination with wholly fragmented understanding and meaning; (4) Understanding is a mental force whereas imagination/judgment is a mental action — a fundamental ontological distinction that departs from Kant's treatment of both as faculties of the same type. Human knowledge necessarily concludes when all understanding has been fragmented into nonintegrable meaning quanta and imagination achieves a single complete global form. At that terminus, the question 'why?' loses all ground, for no residual meaning remains to motivate or sustain it
Dahli Chabane (2026) studied this question.