From Situational to Unconditional: The Spectrum of Moral Commitment Required for Multi-Agent Survival in Non-linear Social Dilemmas

We establish the Moral Commitment Spectrum: a systematic relationship between environmental severity and the minimum moral commitment required for multi-agent system survival. In linear PGG environments, situational commitment achieves group-level ESS. In non-linear environments with catastrophic tipping points, pure RL fails (Nash Trap at λ≈0.5, 5.3% survival), and only unconditional commitment (φ1*=1.0) guarantees survival. Key findings: Decentralized baselines (Inequity Aversion, Social Influence) achieve 0% survival under Byzantine conditions—their other-regarding mechanisms cause downward drift toward adversaries' zero contributions. Only unconditional commitment is structurally immune. v2.0.0 (2026-02-28): Unified paper integrating Paper 1 (Situational Commitment) + Paper 2 (Nash Trap). N=100 scale test, Jacobian/Hessian Nash Trap proof, 12-condition f(R_t) sensitivity, same-class baseline comparison (IA, SI). 11 pages, NeurIPS 2026 format. Code: https://github.com/Yesol-Pilot/EthicaAI