Non-Doxastic Faith and the Problem of Evil

The problem of evil is commonly regarded as one of the greatest intellectual obstacles to theistic faith. But this is on the assumption that faith requires belief. In contemporary analytical philosophy of religion, many question this assumption and argue that non-doxastic, or belief-less, faith is possible. In this paper, we consider how the evidential problem of evil affects non-doxastic faith. Non-doxastic faith requires epistemic possibility, and we argue that the impact of evil is determined by how such possibility is understood. If epistemic possibility is understood in the widest sense, the problem of evil becomes irrelevant. If it is understood in a narrow sense, the problem only challenges faith on a probability-based model. Since we are sceptical regarding the possibility of non-arbitrary probability assignment in natural theology, we conclude that the argument from evil is not a pressing issue for a subject of non-doxastic, theistic faith.