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This article examines governance strategies for semiconductors in democracies amid geopolitical pressures, indicating their responses to US demands.
This article focuses on how technologically advanced democracies have been balancing the United States’ security-related pressures in semiconductor governance and the desire to maintain or enhance their relative position in the global semiconductor value chain. The production of semiconductors relies on a global value chain (GVC) shaped by interdependence with different countries in different regions playing a key role. However, escalating Sino-American rivalry has reframed semiconductor governance, with the US leveraging its security patronage to align allies and partners with its strategies, while other nations adopt diverse approaches to balance geopolitical pressures and technological autonomy. This article examines how technologically advanced democracies navigate US demands, employing a framework based on two variables: the degree of security commitment and the relative power in the semiconductor GVC. Through case studies of Taiwan, the ROK, Japan, and the EU, it identifies four strategic responses (full alignment, hybrid alignment, selective autonomy, and horizontal misalignment) and their implications for semiconductor governance.
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Tercovich et al. (2026) studied this question.
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