This thesis examines the obligation of essential facility holders to provide fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms of access to third-party undertakings that are willing to enter a downstream market. More precisely, it focuses on FRAND licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) and access to core platform services under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). It shows that the FRAND access obligation aims to strike a proper balance between the conflicting interests of essential facility holders (SEP holders and gatekeepers) and third-party undertakings (standard implementers and business users) that wish to enter the market. A breach of this obligation by undertakings with significant market power raises substantial antitrust concerns under Article 102 TFEU, as it may result in exclusionary or exploitative practices. It is therefore crucial to examine the meaning of FRAND in these two contexts carefully and highlight the similarities and differences regarding the interpretation and enforcement through a comparative legal analysis. Furthermore, this thesis identifies existing challenges in the proper implementation of the FRAND obligation and suggests policy changes that could effectively address those risks and facilitate its objectives, namely, maintaining competition within the internal market undistorted, fostering innovation, and enhancing consumers’ welfare. Given that the FRAND concept pertains to access to key sectors of the economy, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and digital platforms, there is growing academic and business interest surrounding it.
Απόστολος Καρασακαλίδης (2025) studied this question.