Election boycotts are puzzling phenomena because they appear to only confirm government victory. Although opposition parties in authoritarian regimes frequently resort to boycotts, few studies have systematically examined the motivations underlying this behaviour. To understand the incentives and conditions enabling such seemingly self-defeating behaviour, this article develops a formal model of government–opposition interaction under authoritarianism. The analysis shows that, from the perspective of resource conservation, election boycotts serve two critical functions. First, they can induce the government to act in ways desired by the opposition. In some cases, opposition parties boycott elections to deter an autocratic government from cancelling subsequent elections. Conserving resources through election boycotts strengthens their capacity to threaten the government if cancellation occurs. Second, boycotts allow opposition parties to carry over resources to overcome entry barriers that would otherwise be insurmountable. These findings contribute to the literature on democratisation by elections by clarifying the factors that sustain autocratic governments’ commitment to holding elections and those that shape opposition parties’ strategic participation.
Kana Inata (Thu,) studied this question.