Evolutionary institutional theory explains who is selected (memes as replicators, institutions as vehicles) and what pattern characterizes long-run legal evolution (99.3% gradual, 0.7% punctuated). What remains unexplained is when and why institutional equilibria change. This paper addresses that temporal gap. I model institutional stasis as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in the sense of Maynard Smith (1982): a configuration of legal norms, enforcement mechanisms, and professional networks such that no alternative configuration can invade when rare. Basin depth, the minimum perturbation required to escape an institutional ESS, is formalized as a function of the Constitutional Lock-in Index (CLI). Using replicator dynamics applied to four Latin American jurisdictions (Argentina CLI = 0.89, Spain CLI = 0.51, Brazil CLI = 0.40, Chile CLI = 0.24) and 60 reform episodes (1983-2025), I derive four falsifiable predictions. First, the magnitude of exogenous shock required for successful institutional punctuation correlates positively with pre-shock CLI (ρ ≥ 0.70). Second, post-punctuation CLI drops by at least 0.20 within five years of successful regime transition. Third, failed reform attempts leave CLI unchanged (variation < 5%). Fourth, the Institutional Evolvability Index (IEI) predicts which jurisdictions are candidates for the next punctuation event. The framework reconciles Dawkins and Gould without distorting either: intermemetic selection (Level 1) assembles the ESS; emergent stability at the configuration level produces Gould’s stasis; standard replicator dynamics on a shifting fitness landscape produce punctuation without requiring species-level selection as a separate causal force.
Ignacio Adrian LERER (Tue,) studied this question.