Does Justice Have a Place for Values?

The discourse of moral values in jurisprudence is both a political and a legal issue. Moral values influence human beliefs and, consequently, the actions of lawyers, who are hardly aware of that influence. Appeals to moral values in court are often associated with the natural law theory, whereas legal positivism considers this appeal unacceptable. However, the recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of proponents of value-based justification for judicial acts. This trend requires a deeper reflection on the dangers warned about by the critics of axiological approach. No less important is the problem of determining the spectrum of tools and methods for resolving collisions between legally relevant values. Using the formal-legal (dogmatic) method and the analysis method, the author analyzed various functions that moral values perform in the sphere of law and justice. In law, values proved to act as (a) elements of judicial evaluation, (b) criteria for assessing legal facts, (c) social regulator, subsidiary to law, (d) auxiliary instruments for interpreting legal norms. While the very procedure of judicial discretion already implies a certain axiological aspect, this thesis does not contradict even the most exclusive legal positivism.