Does Artificial Intelligence Possess Semantic Understanding of Linguistic Expressions?

This is an English translation of the author's previous work. Abstract Against the backdrop of active debates regarding whether artificial intelligence possesses understanding, this paper views this issue as a central axis of long-standing problems in the philosophy of mind. It aims to resolve problems in both artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind by establishing a more concrete and precise concept of 'understanding'. Regarding the structure of the paper, it develops by first explaining my arguments and concepts, then citing existing research to support these claims, and finally presenting my perspectives. In this paper, I distinguish understanding into syntactic understanding and semantic understanding. I argue that the coupling of qualitative information with syntactic understanding generates semantic understanding. Furthermore, I explain that AI does not have semantic understanding by asserting that while AI possesses only syntactic understanding, humans possess semantic understanding. I expect this paper to contribute to resolving problems in the philosophy of mind through the establishment of a more sophisticated concept of 'understanding' and to provide guidance in setting the direction for AI to acquire semantic understanding.