This study examines how institutional regimes governing employee inventions shape the national innovation system (NIS) performance, with particular attention to technological catch-up in Asian economies. We conceptualize employee invention regimes as a core institutional component of NIS that structures incentives for knowledge creation, appropriation and diffusion. We classify countries into employer-centred (Group A), inventor-oriented (Group B), contract-based (Group C) and transitional regimes (Group D) according to their legal ownership frameworks. Using US Patent and Trademark Office data covering 1976–2021, we construct comparative indicators of technological cycle time, localization, originality, generality, appropriability, diversification and science–technology linkage. Analysis of variance reveals systematic institutional associations. Inventor-oriented regimes are associated with shorter technological cycles and stronger localization, suggesting advantages for adaptive and incremental innovation in latecomer economies. In contrast, contract-based regimes are associated with higher originality, broader technological generality and stronger science–patent linkages, reflecting their suitability for science-intensive innovation. These findings reveal a structural paradox within NISs: institutional arrangements that promote rapid catch-up may simultaneously limit integration with frontier science unless supported by complementary institutions. By integrating legal ownership regimes into the NIS framework, this study contributes to comparative institutional analyses of innovation and offers context-sensitive insights for Asian economies.
Phan et al. (2026) studied this question.