Defining Moral Injury: A Natural Scaffold

The concept of moral injury (MI), while increasingly referenced across disciplines, remains under-theorised philosophically, with current definitions often relying on subjective intuitions of “what is right.” This paper addresses a critical gap by interrogating the ethical foundations of MI and proposing a normative framework that resists conceptual drift. Drawing on natural law theory with its roots in natural justice, I argue that the developing construct requires grounding in principles of intelligibility, universality, and objectivity—all criteria essential for any robust ethical theory. Through a systematic conceptual analysis, I delineate the dynamic interplay between ethics , moral conscience , and behaviour , demonstrating how natural law thinking can safeguard the construct from moral relativism and ideological annexation. This approach not only strengthens definitional clarity but also enhances interdisciplinary applicability, offering a philosophically rigorous foundation for future research and practice. By anchoring MI within an enduring ethical tradition, the paper advances its theoretical development and positions it as a concept of significant interdisciplinary and societal relevance.