PulseExploreJournal ClubDebatesTrendingResearchersJournals
Instagram
HomeExploreJournal ClubTrending
Synapse
⌘+K
Synapse
March 31, 20260 citationsOpen Access

Bid-Rigging Detection under Label Scarcity: Learning Curves and Jurisdiction-Specific Screening

View Full Paper
ADAndrés Díaz-GilBZBryan Zaldívar

Key Points

  • This work explores the challenges of detecting bid rigging across different jurisdictions with limited labeled data.
  • Evaluated models trained on multiple jurisdictions excluding the target one.
  • Tested the performance of these models on the excluded jurisdiction.
  • Estimated learning curves by varying the number of labeled tenders available for training.
  • Cross-jurisdiction transfer reduces effectiveness, with non-portable collusive bidding patterns.
  • Gradient boosting recovers significant local performance even with small labeled datasets in certain jurisdictions.
  • The interaction of label scarcity and jurisdictional differences constrains performance more than label scarcity alone.

Abstract

Machine learning methods are increasingly used to screen for bid rigging in public procurement. Prior research shows that supervised models can substantially improve on traditional screening rules when a sufficiently rich archive of confirmed cartel cases is available, but it also suggests that predictive performance may deteriorate when models are transferred across jurisdictions with different procurement environments. In practice, these constraints may arise jointly: confirmed domestic cartel cases may be scarce, and models trained elsewhere may not transport reliably to a different institutional setting. This work studies that joint problem directly. Using a multi-jurisdiction dataset of 40,960 bids from confirmed cartel and competitive tenders, we first evaluate cross- jurisdiction transfer by training models on all jurisdictions except the target one and testing them on the excluded jurisdiction. We then estimate within-country learning curves under extreme label scarcity by varying the absolute number of labeled tenders available for training. The results point to a consistent pattern. Cross-jurisdiction transfer often deteriorates materially, reinforcing earlier evidence that collusive bidding patterns are not fully portable across procurement environments. In our benchmark, these losses appear especially marked once performance is evaluated relative to a local oracle on a prevalence-adjusted scale. At the same time, supervised gradient boosting recovers a substantial share of attainable local performance with relatively small labeled sets in some jurisdictions, although the rate of recovery is highly heterogeneous. In this benchmark, the interaction between label scarcity and institutional heterogeneity appears more constraining than label scarcity on its own. These findings suggest that, in settings like ours, even a modest domestic labeled archive can be valuable when authorities seek to build jurisdiction-specific screening tools.

Ask AI
Helpful
Bookmark
Share
View Full Paper

Cite This Study

Díaz-Gil et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69cb6589e6a8c024954b9943https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19311712
Ask AI
Helpful
Bookmark
Share
View Full Paper