This article examines the normative conflict between intellectual property (IP) regimes and the benefit-sharing framework established under the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). The BBNJ Agreement reaffirms the principle of the common heritage of humankind (CHH). Its distributive objectives remain structurally constrained by international IP rules that prioritise exclusivity and market-driven innovation. The article interrogates the role of patents over upstream technologies (including sequencing platforms, bioinformatics infrastructures, and synthetic biology tools) in creating cumulative access barriers that disproportionately disadvantage states with limited scientific and institutional capacity. Through doctrinal legal analysis and institutional design theory, the article evaluates the clearing-house mechanism (CHM) and the Capacity-Building and Transfer of Marine Technology (CBTMT) Committee as potential governance infrastructures capable of embedding equity into the BBNJ framework. It demonstrates how these mechanisms operationalise traceability, transparency, and inclusive knowledge flows, effectively tethering IP-based innovation to the distributive logic of the ocean commons. The article proposes adaptive licensing models, mandatory disclosure requirements for digital sequence information (DSI), and the reconceptualisation of property as stewardship-bound obligation. It concludes that equitable access to marine genetic resources depends on integrating CHH into the governance of knowledge production, ensuring that value derived from the ocean commons remains legally connected to collective benefit.
Veiga et al. (2026) studied this question.
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