ABSTRACT The influence of minority shareholder activism on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) greenwashing is examined in this study, and the results reveal that active voting by minority shareholders places pressure on management, thereby increasing their catering behavior in terms of ESG greenwashing. Mechanistic analysis reveals that the pressure from minority shareholder activism leads to managerial myopia, which increases ESG greenwashing. Furthermore, negative sentiment among minority shareholders amplifies management's catering behavior. The heterogeneity test indicates that a concentrated ownership structure can mitigate the positive relationship between minority shareholder activism and ESG greenwashing, while the standalone release of ESG reports can exacerbate ESG greenwashing. This study provides new insights from the perspective of catering theory, offers theoretical support for understanding the impact of minority shareholder activism on ESG greenwashing and provides empirical evidence to inform policies aimed at addressing the negative effects of such activism.
Qian et al. (2026) studied this question.