Can Rousseau's Theory of the General Will be Illuminated with J. Searle's Collective Intentionality?

Freedom has been one of the most fundamental debates in the history of political philosophy. During the Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau sought to develop a theory of freedom grounded in the social contract. According to Rousseau, the original form of freedom that existed in primitive societies had been lost in the modern era. Therefore, individuals must reclaim their freedom. In this context, he formulated a new social organization based on the idea of the general will to address the problem of freedom. While this theory seemed the best solution for Rousseau, it has received significant criticism. Making freedom meaningful in terms of subject-state relations is vital for political discourse. In this regard, I believe that Rousseau's theory, based on the consensus of all wills, can still serve as a resource for political theories. Therefore, I believe it is helpful to reexamine and illuminate Rousseau's theory within the axes of the subject and the collective general will. In this context, I examine John Searle's theory of collective intentionality. I argue that Searle's concept of collective intentionality offers a valuable perspective on the passages in Rousseau's theory of the general will that leave the coexistence of the individual and general wills unclear.