Against the background of carbon neutrality, the government’s carbon regulations have had a profound impact on the distributed energy sharing behavior of industrial parks. To deeply explore the interactive relationship between distributed energy sharing in industrial parks and government regulation, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model composed of the government, core enterprises and supporting enterprises; endogenizes government behavior; and integrates inter-enterprise contractual mechanisms into the evolutionary framework. By establishing a revenue payment matrix and a replication dynamic equation, the stability conditions and system evolution paths of the strategy choices of each subject are analyzed, and numerical simulations are conducted. The results show that there are multiple evolutionary stable equilibria in the system, among which the equilibrium where core enterprises actively share, supporting enterprises actively share, and the government actively regulates carbon is the ideal state. Cost-sharing contracts and cooperative penalty contracts play a significant role in promoting the participation of supporting enterprises in sharing and curbing “free-riding” behavior, respectively. The changes in government subsidy rates and carbon tax rates have a crucial impact on the evolution of corporate strategies. Quantitatively, the carbon tax rate exhibits a threshold effect; enterprises shift to positive energy sharing when the tax rate exceeds 0.8, while a subsidy rate above 0.4 leads the government to withdraw from regulation. This indicates that a reasonable design of carbon regulations can help achieve coordinated energy emission reduction between the government and enterprises. The findings provide theoretical support for optimizing carbon regulations and designing cooperation strategies.
Fu et al. (Fri,) studied this question.